Abstract
A Necessary Debate
Andreas Paulus is right: 'a debate is indispensable when the very foundations of the international legal (un)order are at stake'. Indeed, there can be no doubt about the fundamental importance of 'defining the crime [of aggression] and setting out the con ditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime '. 1 It is in light of this particular importance of the subjectmatter that the Special Work ing Group on the Crime of Aggression (Special Working Group) was open not only to states parties to the ICC Statute, but to all states and a quite considerable number of nonstate parties, including China, the Russian Federation, India, and many Arab states, have taken an active part in the discussions of recent years. This debate will continue and probably intensify during the leadup to the First Review Conference on the ICC Statute (to be held in May 2010 in Kampala) because, and contrary to what Paulus perhaps fears, the decision to allow the Court to exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggression is no 'done deal that merely hinges on technicalities'.
The Special Working Group has sought to do what it could to prepare the ground for the final decision. This decision must and will be a political one. The completion of the Special Working Group's work 2 and the submission of 'Draft amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court on the Crime of Aggression' 3 and 'Draft Elements of Crimes' 4 do not anticipate the political decision which remains to be made. However, the work of the Special Working Group makes such an (informed) decision possible. No doubt, the final decision will not only be about those (not merely technical) questions that remain open, i.e., the proper role of the Security Council and the procedure governing the entry into force of any agreed text. Instead, the ultimate decision must and will be based, as Paulus suggests, on an overall assessment of the merits and shortcomings of the respective drafts and any possible repercussions of their application in practice on the international legal landscape and world public order.
There is little reason to fear that the debate will be confined to the 'usual circles of international criminal lawyers' (whatever those circles are). Most members of the Special Working Group were public international law experts sent from capitals or from the permanent missions in New York. It is not difficult to predict that public international lawyers will continue to play an influential part in the final political decisionmaking process which will soon start. The debate which Paulus wants to stimulate is thus a necessary one. It should, however, be borne in mind that it is not an entirely new one. The modern debate about the law and politics of the crime of aggression spans about a century and is extremely rich.
5 Also, on close inspection, the latest chapter of the discussion, starting in 1995 with the opening of the formal nego tiation process on the establishment of the ICC and intensifying greatly with the many years of intensive work within the Special Working Group, reveals an extremely lively exchange of arguments which took place in almost complete transparency 6 and was accompanied by quite a considerable number of scholarly contributions which were by no means confined to the legal niceties of the subject. 7 
The Common Starting Point
Paulus and I start from the same premise, a premise which has recently been con firmed by the English House of Lords:
10 The inclusion of the crime of aggression in the list of crimes covered by the ICC Statute and the formulation of the mandate to work towards enabling the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime 11 were no hazard ous decision because the crime of aggression, as much as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, is a crime under general customary international law. 
A Jus contra bellum and jus in bello
Paulus fears that the Court's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression could lead to a 'mingling between jus ad bellum and jus in bello issues'. This fear is unwar ranted. The point raised resembles an argument which was made soon after the entry into force of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. At the time, it was suggested that the fundamental principle of equal application of the law of international armed conflict could not coexist with the prohibition on the use of force; the ILC even doubted the usefulness of continuing to study the law of international armed conflict after the major breakthrough in the field of the jus contra bellum. 15 As is well known, these ten dencies remained shortlived 16 and the law of international armed conflict together with its basic principle of equal application is alive and healthy, notwithstanding the fact that the ban on the use of force has grown into a cornerstone of the international legal order. I find it difficult to see why the same coexistence should not be possible on the secondary level of international criminal law. I do not entertain any doubt that international judges will be capable of distinguishing between jus contra bellum and For an influential response to the sceptics of a possible coexistence between the two branches of law see H. Lauterpacht, 'The Limits of the Operation of the Law of War ', 30 British Yrbk Int'l L (1953) 206. jus in bello issues and will be prepared to adjudicate on war crimes on both sides of the conflict irrespective of any concurrent determination that crimes of aggression were committed.
Paulus also fears that the ICC's exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression could reduce the pressure on those fighting on the side of the aggressor to follow the jus in bello. His important policy question is as follows: '[i]f the leadership of one party has already been singled out by the Court as the culprit for an armed conflict, what incentive does it have for upholding the jus in bello?'. Paulus' question is built upon only one possible effect of criminal law: deterrence, and a complete discussion of the matter would have to include considerations of criminal law theory. 17 The following reaction will remain confined to the issue of deterrence. In that respect, Paulus' argu ment ignores the leadership character of the crime of aggression. This specificity of the crime implies that those who actually execute the state act of aggression and who are in a position directly to commit war crimes are under no threat of being prosecuted for the crime of aggression and retain every possible incentive derived from international criminal law not to commit war crimes. I would even argue that the retention of such incentive constitutes the best explanation of the existence of the leadership require ment.
18 That does not mean that Paulus' argument fails completely, but it must be reformulated as follows: '[t]he leadership of the aggressor state, if under threat of pros ecution for a crime of aggression, would no longer hesitate to order the commission of war crimes and the incentive for the subordinates derived from such orders will prove more powerful than the counterstimulus flowing from the law against war crimes'. It is difficult to assess the strength of this reformulated argument. Statements about the deterrent effect of a rule of criminal law always involve a strong element of specula tion. In our context, that speculation is complicated further because of the existence of two conflicting signals.
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But let us assume for the sake of argument that the criminalization of (participat ing in) aggression somewhat increases the likelihood that the aggressive leadership orders the commission of war crimes, and that such orders adversely affect the deter rent effect that the law against war crimes would otherwise have on the soldiers. Would that justify the decision to do without any criminal law deterrent with respect to aggression? I readily accept that the famous serious argument, however, is that it would be most desirable to increase the pressure on state leaders to refrain from aggression. Some of the doubts expressed right after the entry into force of the UN Charter, as to whether the 'laws of war' should survive, were based on the idea that all emphasis should be placed upon the strengthening of the Charter law contra bellum. Paulus' argument would appear to go some way in the opposite direction. Placing all emphasis on international humanitarian law and international human rights law and hereby reducing the importance of respecting the jus contra bellum entails the risk of downplaying the suffering of soldiers and civilians which will almost by necessity be caused even by such a use of armed force which fully respects international humanitarian law. 23 I would therefore plead for the reflection of the coexistence of the jus contra bellum and the jus in bello on the secondary level of international criminal law and international criminal justice.
B 'Lesser' Violations of the Prohibition on the Use of Force
The drafts proposed by the Special Working Group contain a narrow definition of the crime of aggression: there will be no individual criminal responsibility for aggression unless a state act of aggression has been completed 24 and the state's use of armed force will have to pass a certain quantitative and qualitative threshold. 25 Paulus fears that this restrictive approach to the secondary rule of criminal sanction will cause 'collateral damage' to the effectiveness of the more comprehensive primary rule of conduct, i.e. the prohibition on the use of force.
26 Yet, it is widely accepted, at least within liberal states, that criminal law is the ultima ratio of all legal sanctions, and the inevitable consequence is that many (primary) rules of conduct remain outside the ambit of the (secondary rules of) criminal law. The same must be true for the international legal order; in fact, the sovereignty of states makes the use of the crimi nal law instrument even more sensitive. The current state of international criminal law perfectly reflects that fundamental caution: Not all violations of the law of armed conflicts constitute war crimes under international law, and many human rights vio lations are not criminalized under international criminal law. With respect to those violations of international law, states continue to rely on the more traditional (and softer) means of enforcement. I fail to see why the situation should be fundamentally 23 Human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, in particular, run this risk when they (rather astonishingly) explain their continuous silence regarding the crime of aggression by their 'limited mandate '. 24 Illegal threats to use force and 'attempted' state acts of aggression are not covered by the proposed defini tion of the crime. In particular, the requirement of a completed state act of aggression also applies to those who (merely) plan and prepare such an act. While this may not be crystal clear from the language of draft Art. 8bis, it is placed beyond question by Element 3 of the draft Elements of the crime (ICCASP/8/INF.2, at 14). In my opinion, the provision on attempt in Art. 25(3)(f) of the ICC Statute, supra note 1, does not apply to a state's act of aggression. I have indicated the reasons in my Discussion paper 1; ICCASP/4/32, at 384.
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The quantitative threshold is established through the use of the words 'gravity and scale' in Art. 8bis. On the qualitative threshold see infra sect. 4B. different with respect to the prohibition on the use of force. Here again, there are very good policy reasons to confine the use of the criminal law instrument to the noyau dur of the primary rule of conduct, and nothing prevents states from using all other avail able remedies where an illegal use of force does not pass the international criminal law threshold.
At one stage of the development one could perhaps try empirically to assess whether the use of the international criminal law instrument negatively impacts upon the effectiveness of international rules of conduct which remain outside the protective scope of international criminal law, and whether such a negative impact is not out weighed by the enhanced enforcement through international criminal law within its scope of application.
27 But I would submit that the question is essentially the same for all crimes under international law, and that compelling reasons should be given why the crime of aggression should receive special treatment.
The Proposed Definition of the State Act of Aggression
Paulus' critique of the proposed definition of the state act of aggression in draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute is directed to the reference to the annex to GA Resolution 3314 and to the requirement that the act of aggression must constitute a 'manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations'. I shall deal with those two points in turn.
A The Reference to the Annex to GA Resolution 3314
I agree with Paulus that the reference to the annex to GA Resolution 3314 (Resolution 3314) in the second sentence of paragraph 2 of draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute is problematic, and that it would have been preferable to define the state component of the crime of aggression without reference to that document. 28 Ironically, the decision to refer to Resolution 3314 despite the fact that there was never a consensus to apply that Resolution as a statute of international criminal law 29 was strongly favoured by diplomats with a public international law background, who placed more importance upon relying on an agreed document than upon the difficulties of transposing that document into a criminal law context. The idea of using Resolution 3314 was by no means uncontroversial. Germany, in particular, had voiced its preference for an autonomous and generic definition throughout the drafting process. Unfortunately, a clear majority of delegations took a different view.
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The renaissance of international criminal law since the 1990s and the entry into force of the ICC Statute in 2002 are so recent that the appropriate moment in time for such an assessment has not yet come; for the same view see May, supra note 7, at 323. The transposition of the list of state acts of aggression in Article 3 of Resolution 3114 causes problems in two respects: It may be doubted whether the acts described in letters (c) and (e) will, as a rule, reach the gravity threshold required for the crime of aggression. This problem, however, can be solved through the application of the special gravity threshold in draft Article 8bis(1) of the ICC Statute. The act of aggression referred to in letter (f) is more problematic because, as Paulus recognizes, it can be criticized for confusing a state's use of force with a state's act of assistance to the use of force by another state. It is dif ficult to predict how international judges would react to the transposition of this internal inconsistency of Resolution 3314 into the international criminal context. How significant a shortcoming this uncertainty is depends on what is thought of the idea of criminalizing the leadership of a state which (merely) renders assistance to an aggressor state. character, gravity and scale, constitute . . . a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations'. This qualifier has been under discussion within the Special Working Group, but its inclusion is supported by a clear majority of delegations, and for quite a few states the adoption of the 'qualifier' constitutes a conditio sine qua non for accepting the definition as a whole. Paulus' critique, if I understand it correctly, can be decon structed into three distinct objections: (1) the ambiguity of the word 'manifest'; (2) the application of the 'qualifier' to controversial cases of the use of force; (3) the (possible) effect of making the definition of the crime a 'dead letter'. Again, I shall try to deal with the issues in turn.
As Paulus recognizes, one effect of the 'qualifier' is to pose a quantitative threshold. There is widespread agreement within the Special Working Group that the ICC shall not intervene in border skirmishes (and the like), and the words 'gravity and scale' clearly express the drafter's intent to that effect. The second function of the 'qualifier', which is of paramount importance for quite a few states, is to pose a qualitative threshold by exclud ing legally controversial cases from the scope of the definition. The word 'manifest' is, I concede, less clear in that respect, and perhaps not all states represented in the Special Working Group would concur with this interpretation. Still, there are compelling argu ments in support of such a reading of the 'qualifier'. Despite its relative openness, the word 'character' already suggests that the requirement of a 'manifest violation of the United Nations Charter' does not impose merely a quantitative threshold. Furthermore, the travaux préparatoires reveal that those who support the inclusion of the 'qualifier' understand it to pose both a quantitative and a qualitative threshold. For example, para graph 24 of the 2008 Report of the Special Working Group reads as follows:
Delegations supporting this threshold clause noted that it would appropriately limit the Court's jurisdiction to the most serious acts of aggression under customary international law, thus excluding cases of insufficient gravity and falling within a grey area. This approach would garner the widest possible support for the definition of the crime of aggression, which was necessary for achieving universality.
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In light of this negotiation record and the requirements contained in Article 22(2) of the ICC Statute to construe the definitions of a crime strictly and, in case of genuine doubt, in favour of the person being investigated, prosecuted or convicted, it would seem almost inconceivable that an international judge would reduce the legal signifi cance of the 'qualifier' to a quantitative threshold. Moreover, only by accepting also a 'qualitative' threshold will it be possible to keep the crime of aggression within the confines of customary international law and hereby to respect the fact that 'one of the major guiding principles in the elaboration of the definitions of the crimes [listed in Article 5(1) of the ICC Statute] was that these definitions should be reflective of cus tomary international law'. Among those who have devoted more detailed studies to the subject, there is wide spread agreement that the crime of aggression under customary international law, as it has evolved from the 'creative precedents' of Nuremberg and Tokyo, covers only the noyau dur of the prohibition on the use of force, 34 and the record of the ongoing nego tiations reveals that there is no other opinio iuris communis among states.
35 Scholars have made a number of quite similar suggestions to capture this noyau dur directly through the formulation of a specific collective intent requirement. 36 According to Ger hard Werle such intent must be directed to the (partial) annexation of territory or subjugation of the victim state; 37 Antonio Cassese holds the view that the illegal use of force must be directed to the acquisition of territory, the coercion of the victim state to change its government or its political regime, or else its domestic or foreign policy, or to the appropriation of assets belonging to the victim state; 38 and Oscar Solera sug gests that the use of force must have the purpose of changing the status quo in another state by attacking its military, governmental, or economic structures. 39 In the course of the negotiations, Germany proposed language to that effect, 40 and this resulted in the bracketed option of the 2002 Coordinator's paper pursuant to which the act of aggression must have 'the object or result of establishing a military occupation of, or annexing, the territory of another State or part thereof'. See, in particular, Cassese, supra note 7, at 156 ff; Solera, supra note 5, at 405 ff; Dinstein, supra note 12, at 125 ff; Werle, supra note 12, at 390 ff; Wilmshurst in Politi and Nesi, supra note 7, at 95 ff; Kreß, supra note 31, at 249 ff; Hummrich, supra note 7, at 147 ff, 239 ff; Meron, supra note 7, at 3 ff; MüllerSchieke, supra note 7, at 147 ff. In its 1996 'Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind', the ILC held that 'only a sufficiently serious violation of the prohibition contained in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter' gives rise to individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression: ILC Yearbook (1996 II (2)) 43. On the concept of collective intent in our context see Kreß, supra note 31, at 256 ff. 37 Werle, supra note 12, at 395 (marginal n. 1170).
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Cassese, supra note 12, at 160. Yet, it has proven impossible to reach agreement about the appropriate wording of a specific collective intent requirement. Against this background, the qualitative threshold posed through the requirement of a 'manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations' must be seen as the more modest attempt to reach essentially the same goal by excluding those cases of the use of force from criminalization under international law the legality of which is the subject of genuine legal debate. If com pared with the abovementioned variants of a specific collective intent requirement, the 'pragmatic' threshold in draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute is probably somewhat more inclusive. It can therefore be argued that the proposed definition goes slightly beyond existing customary international law. Yet, we are here confronted with a situ ation where there is no absolute clarity about the applicable definition in customary international law, and hence there is some legitimate scope for 'refining' and thereby 'crystallizing' customary international law. The decision to formulate a pragmatic 'qualitative' threshold rather than a more ambitious one would not seem to exceed the limits of 'crystallizing custom through clarification'.
Paulus argues that the pragmatic 'qualitative threshold' is too indeterminate to be reliably applied because 'any lawyer of some quality [can] find reasons why almost everything is legal or illegal under prevailing circumstances'. I respectfully beg to dif fer. It is no secret among international lawyers that the law on the use of force suffers from what I shall call, in taking up the language used in the 'Princeton Report', a 'grey area'. The existence of such a grey area is not a new fact, but, on closer inspection, it has accompanied the United Nations Charter since its inception. 42 Most importantly, reasonable international lawyers will find it comparatively easy to identify those instances of the use of force which fall within the grey area. If one studies the more recent treatises on the subject, one will almost invariably find the same list of con troversial cases. Elizabeth Wilmshurst gives a fair account of this list when she men tions anticipatory selfdefence, forcible reactions to a 'minor' use of force of another state, armed interventions to rescue nationals, the extraterritorial use of force against a massive nonstate armed attack, and genuine humanitarian intervention. 43 Yes, the international legality of a genuine humanitarian intervention, such as the 1999 NATO air campaign in Kosovo, is also open to genuine debate, and is thus excluded from the scope of draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute. 44 The ICC is not the proper organ to decide whether Paulus and many other international lawyers are right to hold that 'recent attempts to "legalize" humanitarian intervention seem to have failed' as long as a reasonable international lawyer may hold the opposite view. 45 The 'qualifier' would enable the Court to recognize that the legal evaluation of a genu ine humanitarian intervention raises difficult and controversial issues of identifying and weighing the more recent pertinent international practice in light of fundamental principles which underlie the present evolution of international law in general. This would not amount to an implicit endorsement of the legality of such a use of force; 46 the Court would simply recognize that there is no individual criminal responsibility in light of the controversial state of the jus contra bellum in point. 47 It is very hard to dispute that such a finding would be consonant with existing customary international criminal law because, in the case of a genuine humanitarian intervention, a specific collective intent in whatever variant referred to above is conspicuously absent. Paulus seems to doubt that a 'court of law' can make a finding as to whether or not a given use of force was driven by the genuine will to stop atrocities. Yet, the need to establish a certain collective intent arises quite often in international criminal law proceedings, and prosecutors and judges have at their disposal means to meet the challenge. Where doubts persist, the proper decision will be an acquittal.
According to Paulus, the debate about the 2003 use of force against Iraq dem onstrates that 'any lawyer of some quality can find reasons why almost everything is legal'. I do not think that this does justice to both the complexity and sincerity of the discussion that was led about the 2003 war. While I share the majority view among international lawyers that the use of force against Iraq was illegal, I do indeed accept, as Paulus anticipates, that the arguments advanced by Sir Christo pher Greenwood in support of the legality of the invasion 48 cannot be fully refuted.
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In fact, the debate about Iraq demonstrates that reasonable international lawyers are capable of distinguishing between an arguable case and a manifestly erroneous justification for a use of force. An argument that the 'Coalition of the Willing' was entitled to act in 'preemptive selfdefence' would have been manifestly wrong not If, arguendo, a genuine humanitarian intervention is illegal under current international law, I am doubt ful whether the exclusion of such a use of force from draft Art. 8bis of the ICC Statute will substantially contribute to its legalization; for a different view see Murphy, supra note 45.
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After a very stimulating philosophical argument, May, supra note 7, at 296, reaches a very similar con clusion: '[h]umanitarian intervention will remain very controversial at the level of asking about whether States should be condemned and sanctioned for engaging in them. But it is less controversial concerning prosecutions, since there are many reasons to think that State leaders and other individual human per sons should not be convicted in humanitarian intervention cases '. only on the facts, but also as a matter of international law, as there is no tenable basis under current international law for arguing for a right to selfdefence before an armed attack is at least imminent. The 'Coalition of the Willing' was thus well advised not to rely on this argument in the official justifications of its use of force. Instead, as is well known, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America relied on a Security Council mandate to carry out their attack. 50 As I said, on balance I do not find the explanation advanced by the Coalition convincing, but at the same time I do recognize the existence of an arguable case to the contrary, and it is the latter determination that should have been decisive had the issue arisen before an international criminal judge. Whether or not I am right in my legal evalu ation of the 2003 Iraq war is not decisive for the sake of this comment, and I read ily admit that an international judge may face a borderline case even when apply ing the requirement of a manifest violation of the United Nations Charter. My main point is that international legal method is advanced enough to enable reasonable lawyers to distinguish between a spurious attempt to justify an illegal use of force and an arguable case.
Paulus concludes that 'it will be almost impossible for the Court to apply the Work ing Group definition to the "hard cases" of international life'. If the words 'hard cases' mean 'seriously controversial cases as a matter of international law', I would agree. I would add, however, that it is the very purpose of the 'qualitative threshold' to enable the international prosecutor and the international judges to arrive at this conclusion, and that is for two reasons: first, in order to remain within the confines of existing cus tomary international law, and, secondly, in order not to decide major controversies about the content of primary international rules of conduct through the back door of international criminal justice.
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This does not mean that draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute would remain a 'dead letter'. There is agreement that Hitler's and Saddam Hussein's aggressive wars would have come within the definition, and I suspect that the same applies with respect to some other uses of force since 1945. It is true, though, that the requirement of a 'manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations' will make successful pro ceedings for a crime of aggression an exceptional event. But what is wrong with this consequence? Is international criminal law (stricto sensu) not an instrument for exceptionally grave assaults upon the international legal order to be applied with utmost restraint? An expansionist resort to international criminal law must lead to its trivialization. This is true for the crime of aggression as it is for all other crimes under international law. I agree with Paulus, with the majority of international lawyers, and, most impor tantly, with the vast majority of states that there is no legal requirement to make the institution of proceedings for the crime of aggression before the ICC dependant on a prior determination by the Security Council that an act of aggression has occurred. I equally share Paulus' view that no such requirement should be agreed upon in Kam pala for reasons of legal policy. The legal arguments have been set out most forcefully by others, 53 and there is no need to restate them in this comment. In view of my agreement with Paulus, I shall also not attempt to deal comprehen sively with the matter from a perspective of legal policy. 54 I simply wish to make what I think is the crucial point: the ICC constitutes a turning point in the history of inter national criminal justice because its establishment marks the decisive step towards adherence to the principle of equal application of international criminal law. With the birth of the ICC, the international community attempted to cut the cord that linked international criminal justice to the critique of 'victor's justice' and 'policy in the dis guise of law' which previously plagued it. 55 Adherence to the principle of equal appli cation of the law must now be considered as a minimum requirement of legitimacy for a system of permanent international criminal justice. To subject the ICC to the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council falls foul of meeting this basic requirement. Robert Jackson could not avoid developing a strong feeling for this basic truth when he famously stated in his opening speech at Nuremberg 'that while this law is first applied against German aggressors, the law includes, and if it is to serve a useful purpose it must condemn, aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now in judgment'.
56 It is to be greatly deplored that the permanent members of the Security Council are not yet prepared to pay heed to Jackson's power ful promise.
The central policy argument in support of a strict procedural requirement of a prior Security Council determination of a state act of aggression runs as follows: '[to] ask the ICC, in the absence of a determination by the Security Council, to decide that an act of aggression has taken place would force the ICC to become immersed in political con troversies between states. Such an immersion would endanger the ICC's judicial role 53 For detailed expositions of the correct legal view see Schaeffer, supra note 7, at 412 ff; McDougall, supra note 7, at 279 ff; Stein, supra note 7, at 5 ff; for further references see Kreß, 'The Crime of Aggression', supra note 7, at 860 (n. 54); for the contrary view see Ferencz, 'Enabling the International Criminal Court to Punish Aggression', 6 Washington U Global Studies L Rev (2006) 13; Schuster, supra note 8, at 35 ff; Meron, supra note 7, at 12 ff.
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For a somewhat more detailed argument see Kreß, 'The Crime of Aggression', supra note 7, at 862; for a similar view see May, supra note 7, at 225 ff. 57 One possible answer to this argument is that it strongly overemphasizes the 'specificity' of the crime of aggression. 58 Criminal proceedings against those alleg edly most responsible for crimes under international law will often require judgments about state policies. Take the case of Darfur and the preliminary question whether there was a policy of the state of Sudan to launch a genocidal or at least widespread or systematic attack upon innocent human beings. In such a situation, the applica tion of international criminal law will almost inevitably be accompanied by political controversies, and it is hard to see why the challenge of such controversies should be so much greater when it comes to the crime of aggression. The second answer is that the inclusion of the 'qualifier' in the definition precisely serves the goal of preventing the ICC from entering into the controversial grey area of the jus contra bellum. It is thus the definition of the crime itself which ensures that the 'judicial role and image' of the Court will not be endangered. In a case of a massive state act of aggression in manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, however, the 'judicial role and image' of the ICC would be rather damaged if the Court were to remain passive because of the politically motivated veto of one or more permanent members of the Security Council.
Time for Decision
Paulus cautions against making too hasty a decision. He argues that 'much more research is needed' and that 'the time may not be ripe for giving the International Criminal Court jurisdiction over the crime of aggression as long as the disagreement within the international community on jus ad bellum issues persists'. Once more and for a last time, I respectfully beg to differ.
To the extent that there is disagreement within the international community about the jus contra bellum, it is not likely to go away for many years to come. Waiting for the emergence of a more or less complete consensus about the international regulation of the use of force before allowing the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression would thus, in fact, amount to a postponement of the project ad calendas graecas. The consequence would be the lasting impunity also in those instances of the use of force where the legitimacy and the need to use the international criminal law instrument cannot be seriously doubted.
Also, I do not think that after a century of political and scholarly debate about criminalizing aggression 'much more research is needed' to make a decision which is informed both in law and policy. It is not overly realistic to expect that a magic formula of a specific collective intent requirement would shortly emerge which would command universal support. I think it is fair to inform states' leaders about 57 Meron, supra note 7, at 13.
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To overstretch the 'specificity' of the crime of aggression runs like a red thread through those contribu tions which are fundamentally critical of allowing the ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over this crime; for a most thoughtful, careful, and balanced legal and philosophical argument against this tendency see May, supra note 7.
the following background to the proposal submitted by the Special Working Group: a majority of states do not wish to narrow the definition of the state component of the crime through a specific collective intent requirement of any kind. At the same time, a significant number of states will not accept an unqualified reference to Art icles 1 and 3 of the annex to GA Resolution 3314. In that situation, the additional requirement, that the state's act of aggression must constitute a manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations, is both a reasonable and a workable compro mise. It may not meet 'the highest standards of codification' 59 because it is possible to conceive of a more specific definition. Yet, as I have tried to demonstrate in this comment, the suggested solution, on a somewhat closer inspection, proves to be much more determinate than it may seem at first glance. I would argue that it will be easier to apply the qualifier contained in draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute than to pinpoint the minimum requirements of a 'widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population' within the meaning of Article 7(1) of the ICC Statute or to specify the meaning of 'incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects . . . which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated' within the meaning of Article 8(2)(b) (iv) of the ICC Statute. There can be no doubt about the importance of the principle of legal certainty in international criminal law, but it would be unwise to overstretch this principle as the relevant international human rights case law and the (constitu tional) jurisprudence all over the world reveal on closer inspection. I am in no doubt that draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute satisfies the principle of legal certainty and, importantly, it advances legal certainty beyond the current state of customary inter national law. I am equally confident that draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute could and would be reasonably applied by international prosecutors and international judges in the future. In addition, there is an avenue to be offered to those who do not share my trust and feel that they need a 'wait and see period'. If the entry into force of the proposed amendment follows the logic of Article 121(5) of the ICC Statute (the application of which should, for reasons of fairness and legitimacy, be extended to nonstate parties), 60 those states which are particularly concerned that the Court might unduly downplay the significance of the 'qualifier' could withhold their accept ance, and thereby completely shield their nationals from the risk of prosecution first to see the case law unfold. This is another reason why there is no compelling need for a requirement that the Security Council consent to the exercise of the Court's juris diction over the crime of aggression in each and every case.
It would be a little naïve to say that Kampala will confront states with the alter native 'now or never' with respect to the crime of aggression. It is much less naïve, however, to recognize that Kampala will open a 'window of opportunity' to respond to a centuryold challenge of the international legal order which, if not used, may 59 This seems to be the benchmark set by Meron, supra note 7, at 3. remain closed for a very long time. I believe that the response proposed by the Special Working Group, though not free from shortcomings, is solid enough not to let this very significant opportunity pass. Therefore it is my view that, provided that the final compromise regarding the procedural role of the Security Council 61 will not sacrifice the legitimacy of the international criminal justice system on the altar of realpolitik, the 2010 Review Conference in Kampala should mark the historic occasion where states' leaders eventually form the collective will to allow for the prosecution of the most serious violations of jus contra bellum and thereby to complete the new system of permanent international criminal justice.
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For two more recent thoughtful studies on the subject see Schaeffer, supra note 7, at 419 ff; Blokker, supra note 7, at 887 ff.
